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THE VARIABILITY OF
SEQUENCE-SPACE SYNESTHESIA
Sequence-space synesthesia (SSS) is a com-
mon condition in which ordinal sequences
such as months, numbers or the letters of
the alphabet are perceived to occupy spa-
tial locations in the mind’s eye or periper-
sonal or extrapersonal space (e.g., Price
and Mentzoni, 2008; Jonas and Jarick,
2013). For example, thinking about a
month may elicit the visuospatial impres-
sion of a circular arrangement of the
months, or hearing a numeral may elicit
a specifically shaped number line. These
“spatial forms” are typically thought to be
consistent over time within an individual
(e.g., Smilek et al., 2007), though they can
actually evolve (Price and Pearson, 2013;
Gould et al., 2014; Price, 2014; see also
Simner, 2012; Meier et al., 2014). They are
also idiosyncratic, with synesthetes report-
ing many different shapes of varying com-
plexity (Galton, 1880; Phillips, 1897) that
are experienced outside the body (i.e., pro-
jected) or in the mind’s eye (i.e., associ-
ated; Dixon et al., 2004; Smilek et al., 2007;
Ward et al., 2007).
SSS can vary along several dimensions,
including the projector-associator distinc-
tion, automaticity, visual salience, and
type of spatial transformation that can be
applied to the spatial form (e.g., Price,
2013; Price and Mattingley, 2013). Since
SSS could be considered a variety of visu-
ospatial mental imagery, these individual
differences may reflect known fractiona-
tion of imagery processes and skills (Price,
2013; Price and Pearson, 2013). However,
a thorough and empirically grounded tax-
onomy for individual differences in SSS
is missing (Price, 2014). We explore here
a possible systematization for one area
of these individual differences—the visual
and spatial qualities of SSS. We further
suggest this can help to classify synesthetes
as experimental participants and perhaps





The visuospatial experiences of SSS are
often referred to as spatial forms. For
some synesthetes the forms are indeed a
felt impression of spatial locations with
minimal visual content. Others, how-
ever, report having a visual impression of
their forms (Eagleman, 2009; Price, 2013);
examples of detailed visual content such
as texture, color, written text, and, asso-
ciated visual images are often found in
reports on SSS (e.g., Seron et al., 1992;
Jonas et al., 2011; Gould et al., 2014; Price,
2014). It has been speculated (Price, 2013;
Price and Pearson, 2013) that this varia-
tion reflects the distinction, from research
on non-synesthetic imagery, between (1)
spatial imagery of explicit spatial relation-
ships that may be detailed and complex,
which at its most sophisticated level takes
the form of a spatial map with flexi-
ble viewpoints, (2) visual imagery that
depicts visual appearance and more holis-
tically represents visual surface properties.
These complementary aspects of visuospa-
tial imagery are tapped by different behav-
ioral tests, are associated with separable
working memory modules, and are imple-
mented by separable neural networks, with
spatial vs. visual components reflecting the
dorsal vs. ventral streams of visual process-
ing (Hegarty, 2004; Mazard et al., 2004;
Kosslyn et al., 2007).
Here we suggest refining the visual vs.
spatial imagery distinction as previously
applied to SSS. It may be too simplistic
to characterize synesthetes’ forms as being
either visual or spatial (as Price, 2014, sug-
gested). Instead, we should characterize an
individual’s SSS along both visual and spa-
tial dimensions. If these are orthogonal at
the level of the individual, the synesthete
may be independently high or low on each
dimension.
Visual vs. spatial dimensions would
respectively reflect an emphasis of ventral
vs. dorsal stream activation in mediating
synaesthetic imagery. This is consistent
both with the view that SSS is contin-
uous with normal visuospatial imagery
(Price and Mattingley, 2013; Price and
Pearson, 2013), and with proposals that
SSS derives from functionally or struc-
turally abnormal neural connectivity.
Eagleman’s (2009) suggestion that SSS is
mediated by unusual connectivity to ven-
tral stream representations could account
for the visual aspects of SSS that he empha-
sizes. Suggestions that SSS derives from
dorsal stream connectivity between spatial
and magnitude representation in parietal
cortex (e.g., Tang et al., 2008; Hubbard
et al., 2011), could by contrast be more
relevant for spatial aspects.
SPATIAL DIMENSION
This dimension characterizes the extent to
which spatial forms can be construed as
spatial models where people have explicit
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introspective access to the relative posi-
tions of sequence members. A synesthete
low on this dimension has a form viewed
consistently from the same vantage point,
with low spatial resolution. A synesthete
high on this dimension has a more explicit
spatial model which will facilitate spatial
transformations and allow forms to be
seen from multiple viewpoints (Burgess,
2006), even if they have a typical view-
point. The spatial representation may have
vague sketch-like visual qualities but, as
spatial sensation is created multi-modally,
it could also occur without them.
One example of this distinction is seen
in SSS for months, where some synesthetes
report that their form is always located in
the same space, while others report move-
ment of the calendar or the self in relation
to it over the year (Smilek et al., 2007).
A more unusual example of spatial trans-
formation comes from a synesthete (Jarick
et al., 2009, 2010, 2013) who views her
month form from different vantage points
depending on whether she hears or reads
the name of a month.
Different types of sequence may
encourage different degrees of introspec-
tive access, along with different degrees
and varieties of spatial transformation.
For example, the first author (who has
SSS) finds that examining spatial forms
(e.g., her form for exam grades) improves
introspective access. In terms of transfor-
mation, whereas SSS for months is often
reported to move spontaneously with the
passage of time, transformation of num-
ber forms (containing potentially infinite
sequence members) typically involves
more effortful “focus” or “zooming in”
(Seron et al., 1992). By contrast, SSS for
the alphabet (e.g., Jonas et al., 2011) may
make low demands on spatial transforma-
tion because the alphabet does not change
over time and is constrained enough to be
seen from one viewpoint.
VISUAL DIMENSION
For synesthetes with low visual experience,
spatial forms will seem to occupy space,
but lack depictive visual quality. By con-
trast, synesthetes with high visual experi-
ence “see” their spatial form in visual detail
from a particular viewpoint in their mind’s
eye, or in peripersonal or extrapersonal
space (converging respectively with Ward
et al. (2007), classification of grapheme-
color synesthetes as see-associators, expe-
riencing colors in their minds’ eye, or
projectors, whose graphemes have colors
“out there” in the world).
ORTHOGONAL DIMENSIONS
The relation between these proposed spa-
tial and visual dimensions of SSS experi-
ence remains to be empirically established.
However, taking SSS for months as an
example, we can envisage a 2× 2 matrix
containing the four extreme combinations
of high and low spatial and visual char-
acteristics (Table 1). Gradations between





Given the assumption that SSS is
consistent over at least short periods of
time, a common method of verifying SSS
is to quantify this consistency because,
even with a very good memory, a non-
synesthete would be unlikely to mimic
the consistency arising from perceiving a
spatial form.
The least stringent consistency test,
used by Sagiv et al. (2006, N = 311), is
to ask participants to draw their spa-
tial associations twice, weeks or months
apart, and to assess whether the drawings
match. Sagiv et al. estimated prevalences of
20% for SSS involving time (days and/or
months), 12% for SSS involving numbers,
and 15% for SSS involving the alphabet
(totaling 29% prevalence for any of the
three types).
More stringent methods have since
been developed, including Brang et al.
(2010) within-session technique of ask-
ing participants with SSS for months to
“project” their form onto a computer
screen and indicate month location with
mouse-clicks (each month was tested five
times). This yielded a prevalence esti-
mate of 2.2%, defined as the proportion
of participants (N = 183) whose consis-
tency was> 1.96 SD above the mean. This
estimate is not directly comparable with
Sagiv et al.’s estimate of 20% Brang et al.
focused on months while Sagiv et al. made
no distinction between days and months.
Additionally, Brang et al.’s classification of
participants as synesthetes if they showed
outlier consistency is far more strin-
gent than the criterion adopted by Sagiv
et al. and as Brang et al. admitted, may
have been overly conservative. Other stud-
ies have obtained estimates intermediate




















There is a vague non-visual feeling of
approximate fixed positions for months
(i.e., little depictive visual quality, little
detailed introspective access and/or
transformational flexibility as a spatial
model).
There is a precise but non-visual knowledge of month positions




The spatial layout of the month form is
vividly visualized in a holistic manner, from
a fixed perspective, and relative spatial
locations need to be inspected effortfully
in the visual image rather than being
known directly.
There is precise knowledge of month positions, relative to each
other or to the body of the viewer, and the spatial model of the
months can be rotated, and/or viewed from different
perspectives, and or traveled in mentally. Different viewpoints
of the spatial form are instantiated as vivid visual images with
depictive quality of surface characteristics of the form.
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between these extremes (e.g., Chun and
Hupé, 2013), but here we wish to raise the
point that an additional cause of widely
varying prevalence estimates may be that
different methods selectively target differ-
ent sub-types of spatial form.
For example, “projecting” one’s month
calendar onto a screen is likely easier for
synesthetes high on the spatial dimension,
who can view and rescale their calendar.
Other synesthetes could be missed, and
Brang et al. notably reported that some
kind of mental layout for the months was
verbally reported for 44% of their sam-
ple. Sagiv et al.’s drawing method may,
by contrast, be easier for synesthetes high
on the visual dimension. If highly visual
SSS were more common than highly spa-
tial SSS, then it is perhaps unsurprising
that visually-based prevalence estimates
such as that of Sagiv et al. are higher
than spatially-based estimates such as that
of Brang et al. It is indeed likely that
visual SSS is most common: Strong experi-
ence of visual imagery seems more preva-
lent than strong spatial imagery in the
general population (Chabris et al., 2006;
Blazhenkova and Kozhevnikov, 2009), and
several studies have found that samples
of people with SSS—who were more
neutrally recruited via verbal report—
show elevated self-report scores for visual,
but not spatial, imagery (Price, 2009;
Rizza and Price, 2012; Meier and Rothen,
2013).
BEHAVIORAL MEASURES OF MENTAL
IMAGERY IN PEOPLE WITH SSS
Although high self-reported visual
imagery scores among synesthetes seem
replicable, results from behavioral tests
of visuospatial imagery have been mixed
(for further discussion see Simner, 2013;
Price, 2013). Simner et al. (2009) found
increased accuracy in synesthetes with
time-related forms compared to con-
trols on Benton’s test of 3D praxis, VOSP
progressive silhouettes, and 3D mental
rotation. Brang et al. (2013) reported
increased accuracy in time-space synes-
thetes performing 2D mental rotation
of letters compared to non-synesthetes.
However, Rizza and Price (2012) reported
that time-space synesthetes performed
no better than non-synesthetes on 3D
imagery tests of paper folding and mental
rotation.
To distinguish between rival expla-
nations for these discrepancies (e.g.,
demand characteristics; lack of power;
non-equivalence of tasks in different stud-
ies), further replication is needed with
larger sample sizes and multiple behav-
ioral imagery tests. However, we suggest
that individual differences in synesthetes
along spatial and visual dimensions could
contribute to varied findings. For example,
synaesthetes who are low on our visual
dimension may not perform 3D mental
rotation unusually well because this test
correlates with self-reported spatial rather
than visual imagery (e.g., Blazhenkova
and Kozhevnikov, 2010). This may have
been the case for the study by Rizza and
Price (2012). If so-called “spatial” forms
are often visual in nature (Eagleman, 2009;
Price, 2013), and if such forms are more
common than highly spatial variants,
then it is plausible that small, randomly-
selected SSS samples will contain few
highly spatial participants. However, if
the recruitment method favors spatial SSS,
then a synesthete advantage for mental
rotation may be obtained because such
participants are by definition good at
spatial transformation.
CONCLUSION
We have suggested that characterizing SSS
in terms of its orthogonal spatial vs. visual
properties may capture some of the ways
in which this experience varies between
individuals. We have also speculated that
failure to make this type of distinction
between individual synesthetes may con-
tribute to widely differing prevalence esti-
mates and to divergent claims about the
visuospatial skills associated with SSS.
Further defining and refining empirical
methods for classifying participants along
spatial and visual dimensions would pro-
vide a helpful way to screen participants
in future studies addressing the prevalence,
behavioral correlates and neurocognitive
basis of this condition.
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